Levinas is almost solely studied from the perspective of phenomenology, and this is evidently quite justifiable by the fact that the philosopher claims to be Husserl’s heir, although it is very importante to consider other influences for a deeper understanding of his thought, such as talmudism and Russian literature. But, in general, an important reference remains forgotten that Levinas never fails to mention in his interviews and even in the preface to the German edition (1987) of his important book Totalité (...) et infini: Bergson’s philosophy. Our objective is to seek the elements of this approach, often mentioned but little explored, between the ethical intuitions of Levinas and Bergson. Although it is not the work Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion that Levinas likes to remember when referring to Bergson, it is what we will evoke to suggest an intuitive communication that connects the bergsonian concept of open and the levinasian concept of the infinite. Levinas takes a step beyond phenomenology when he elaborates one of his fundamental concepts, that of visage, and it is he himself who admits in the conversation with Philippe Nemo entitled Éthique et infini (1984), but we should be surprised if the most important notion of Levinas ethics, that of infinity, would reveal what is most essential in Bergson’s ethics, the sense of openness through which unlimited, in other words, unconditional, responsibility is announced? (shrink)

From the perspective of a contemporary German reader, one consideration is particularly important from the start. Illumination of the political conduct of Martin Heidegger cannot and should not serve the purpose of a global depreciation of his thought. As a personality of recent history, Heidegger comes, like every other such personality, under the judgment of the historian. In Farias’ book as well, actions and courses of conduct are presented that suggest a detached evaluation of Heidegger’s character. But in general, as (...) members of a later generation who cannot know how we would have acted under conditions of a political dictatorship, we do well to refrain from moral judgments on actions and omissions from the Nazi era. Karl Jaspers, a friend and contemporary of Heidegger, was in a different position. In a report that the denazification committee of the University of Freiburg at the end of 1945, he passed judgment on Heidegger’s “mode of thinking”: it seemed to him “in its essence unfree, dictatorial, uncommunicative.”7 This judgment is itself no less informative about Jaspers than about Heidegger. In making evaluations of this sort Jaspers, as can be seen from his book on Friedrich Schelling, was guided by the strict maxim that whatever truth a philosophical doctrine contains must be mirrored in the mentality and lifestyle of the philosopher. This rigorous conception of the unity of work and person seems to me inadequate to the autonomy of thought and, indeed, to the general history of the reception and influence of philosophical thought. I do not mean by this to deny all internal connection between philosophical works and the biographical contexts from which they come—or to limit the responsibility attached to an author, who during his lifetime can always react to unintended consequences of his utterances. 7. Ott, “Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus,” p. 65. Jürgen Habermas is professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. His most recent books include the two-volume work Theory of Communicative Action and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures . John McCumber is an associate professor of philosophy at Northwestern University. He is the author of Poetic Interaction: Language, Freedom, Reason. (shrink)

by Victor Farías, translated from Spanish and German into French by Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste Grasset, preface by Christian Jambet. Editions Verdier, 332 pp., Fr125 (paper).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's 'Being and Time.'Robert C. ScharffJohannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's 'Being and Time.'Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. 356 + xix. Cloth, $60.00.Focusing on the relatively neglected fifth chapter of Being and Time's Division Two (BT, Sections 72-77), Fritsche argues that BT is an essentially political work. Even Victor Farías, although he talks of "shared attitudes" and (...) "implicit direction," settles for the conclusion that "in no sense can we read National Socialism into Being and Time, but we can identify philosophical beliefs that foreshadow Heidegger's later conviction."(Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism, trans. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989], 60.) Fritsche, however, evidently intends to out-Farías Farías. For him, BT just is "a brilliant summary of the politics of the revolutionary Right" (xii; cf., xv, 216).Following Tom Rockmore, Fritsche insists that by grounding ontological inquiry in a distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, Heidegger is "committed" to "a political understanding of human being" that "culminates" in the analysis of authentic historicity in Section 74 (29). According to Fritsche, BT proceeds, "in conventional metaphysical fashion," to work out a "hierarchical" presentation of the structures and activities of our existence as a "drama in three acts." The first act is Heidegger's analysis of the conflicted, inauthentic, "downward plunging" condition of everyday life. In act two, there arises out of this condition a "crisis" (of conscience) that calls for a "dramatic solution." The third act "consists in authentic Dasein stepping out of the world in which it has been living as ordinary Dasein, turning back to this world, and canceling it... in order to rerealize the past" (x, 29-30).Fritsche plays BT off primarily against three sources, Richard Wolin's Politics of Being (1990), articles by Peg Birmingham (1991), and Charles Guignon (1992), in order to distance BT from "decisionist," "anarchist," and "politically neutral" interpretations, respectively. Like this selection of foils, Fritsche's comparison of texts often seems merely convenient. In general, if two people use the same term, they probably mean the same thing; and key concepts are typically assumed to have uniform definitions. Hence, if Scheler speaks of a hierarchy of values and Hitler, of a hierarchy of races, they must be employing "the same logic" (108-9). And because vorlaufen [anticipating/running ahead] was the term used by right wing German authors to mythologize the gallant but foolish young "heroes of Langemarck" who "stepped out of their trenches, into the open," and "ran toward" French lines, one should also employ this image a "methodological ideal type to interpret Heidegger's concept of resoluteness" (3, 196, 233). Finally, Fritsche makes no systematic distinction between what an author has once said and what either we or the author might later make of it. Hence, if Heidegger says in 1933 that he is drawing on BT for political purposes, he must have had these purposes in mind when writing it ten years earlier (216ff.). And obviously, choosing "Volksgemeinschaft" to talk of community in BT's Section 74 already unmistakably reveals "Heidegger's option for National Socialism" (217-18).One need carry no brief for an apolitical Heidegger to see that Fritsche's reading is problematic on several levels. Heidegger's own account of BT's purpose and method is ignored rather than challenged. Numerous Heideggerian notions are construed, without [End Page 455] argument, as "really" being just right-wing political or "conventional metaphysical" usage. Moreover, categories of Left and Right are sometimes handled so loosely that, for example, Scheler writing in 1913, Heidegger writing in 1921-24, and Hitler in Mein Kampf, all must "belong" to the revolutionary Right, because they all privilege traditional Gemeinschaft over modern Gesellschaft. By the same reasoning, Heidegger's concept of historicity is "identical" to Scheler's and Hitler's. This has to be right because "Heidegger's text is just too excellent a summary of the revolutionary rightist notion to be the result of a somnambulistic thinking" (136). Fritsche's handling of technical terminology, when not outright political, often seems poorly... (shrink)

The conflict which has tended recently to crystallize in particular around the name of Martin Heidegger goes back a long way. Where do philosophers stand in relation to political and social reality? What assistance can their problems and insights offer the process of coming to terms with this reality? In the context of the discussions surrounding Farias's book I set out my own position in Paris in November 1987; the full text was later published in German under the heading “Return (...) to Syracuse?” This title referred to the disappointment Plato felt in his own time when, at the invitation of the tyrant of Syracuse, that city's absolute ruler, he had twice gone to initiate the young prince in the basic principles of his thought concerning the just idea of the state and the just ordering of society. Things turned out badly and Plato had considerable difficulty getting back home again. Later still he was to suffer bitter disappointment when his intimate associate Dion, a member of the innermost circle of his academic community, was suddenly murdered by his own friends after heading a victorious operation to liberate Syracuse (one would like to know more about what lay behind that particular assassination). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 453-454 [Access article in PDF] Gregory Fried. Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi + 302. Cloth, $35.00. That an outstanding philosopher could align himself with a monstrous ideology has always been a scandalous puzzle: but since Farias's Heidegger and Nazism (1989), it is impossible to dismiss Heidegger's "political episode" as the reprehensible but (...) forgivable lapse of a backwoods academic without political sense. Learning that Heidegger not only was a dedicated Nazi, but engineered a postwar cover-up of his involvement, was for many Heideggereans like entering a beloved office and finding swastikas spraypainted over everything. Consternation has hardly died down in the years since. Philosophers have struggled either to repudiate Heidegger's thought entirely or argue that the parts of it he pledged to Nazism were inconsistent with the rest. It isn't that such people deny (or not out loud) what would seem to be an obvious fact: that a bad man can be a good philosopher. They fear that something in Heidegger's thinking somehow "entails" fascism. A dilemma gets set up: either Heidegger's philosophy is contaminated by his actions, or to engage in those actions, Heidegger must have ignored his philosophy.Fried's book on polemos in Heidegger navigates between these horns: on the one hand, Fried dismisses as "absurd" any simple claim that Heidegger's work entails fascism (5), but on the other hand, he attempts to trace, throughout Heidegger's "middle period" (roughly Being and Time to the end of World War II), a notion he believes is consistent with embracing Nazism, not to argue that Heidegger's political decisions were correct or unavoidable, but that they were predictable—though fatally hubristic—responses to the European situation as Heidegger saw it. More, Fried wants to endorse Heidegger's understanding of polemos as valuable for politics today, not because it is insulated against fascism but because fascism is still a possibility we need to confront, even while we attempt to preserve Enlightenment ideals and liberal-democratic institutions in a "nihilistic" world.Heidegger bases his views about polemos ("struggle," "confrontation") on Heraclitus Fragment 53, where it is called "father and king of all." As he explores Heidegger's [End Page 453] treatment, Fried stresses that "what is of interest is not whether Heidegger's interpretations are philologically correct, but rather how these readings shed light on his own way of making sense of history and of politics" (29). And "confrontation" is the closest thing to a consistent political doctrine in Heidegger. He understands it as a respectful opposition that allows each "side" to appear in all its validity and therefore potential risk to the other "side." Confrontation is a principle of interpretation, dialogue between individuals, and interaction between nations (see 79-80). Fried insists that this idea is a crucial part of a number of central Heideggerean concepts, as well as how Heidegger viewed his own task, and Germany's, when National Socialism appeared with its promise of a new spiritual mission for the German Volk. That Heidegger's "romantic" hopes in Nazism were unfounded does not diminish the usefulness of his work on polemos, Fried thinks, because "postmodernist" thinkers, molded by Heidegger, have nothing better to offer as they "confront" the dying or dead "modern" world with dreams of a new society. Some respect for "liberal" values will still be necessary if postmodernist "deconstruction" of oppressive structures is not to leave inroads for new, opportunistic forms of fascism.Fried's is an important study, by a sympathetic but undazzled scholar of Heidegger, of a concept that may be as basic and fruitful as he claims: but his insistence on making everything in "middle Heidegger" depend on it causes him in many places to conflate separate projects and periods in Heidegger's work that were better left distinct. He is particularly unconvincing when he suggests (e.g., 59, 100, 116) that for Heidegger, human beings can "lose their Dasein" and become "unbeings" to whom "Being is... (shrink)

Ponto de partida para a discussãdo do problema do mal entre os autores do Idealismo Alemão é a ideia de Kant acerca do "mal radical". Kant usou este termo para designer a falsificação da liberdade humana. Com efeito, e apesar de a liberdade ser inerente ao ser humano, este carrega sempre consigo a responsabilidade que Ihe corresponde, pois de outra forma não faria qualquer sentidofalar de apelos morals ã mudança Fichte procurou determinor de forma mãs precisa afonte deste "mal radical" (...) no ser humano, identificando-o na letargia ou inercia inerente ao ser humano. Com efeito, é na resistência da natureza sensual do ser humano a toda a actividade intelectual ou espiritual que reside a constante tentacdo de ndo assumir o chamamento para a acção associado com o imperativo categórico. Schelling, por seu lado, encara o problema do mal em conexdo com uma teoria acerca de Deus da Criação. Segundo ele, o ser humano está ainda em processo de devir aquilo mesmo que ele é suposto ser, de onde deriva a sua auto-referencialidade, ou auto-fechamento, as quais no amor de Deus estão já eternamente superadas, mas que no ser humano constituem o da sua "vontade particular". Devido ao temor de perder o seu ser mais próprio (simesmo), o ser humano revela-se incapaz de se auto-transcender e de abdicar dessa "vonta de particular" em favor da "Vontade Universal", como aliás é seu dever. Ora é neste conflito que consiste o drama da Criação, conflito este em que o próprio Deus se permite entrar, já que não ofazer significaria a capitulação do bem em relação ao mal. Para Hegel, finalmente, o problema do mal tern a vercom o problema da independência do espírito. Esta independencia constitui, de facto, a verdadeira determinação do ser humano. Mas isso no preciso momento em que se dá o encontro do ser humano consigo mesmo e o seu vir-a-si-mesmo (Sich-Finden und Zusichkommen), jé que este é o momento em que o ser humano de forma mais completapode efectivamentefalhar o seu alvo. Para Hegel, portanto, é precisament "consciência "- esse espaço em que sed dá maior autonomia e independência do ser humano - onde se verifica o maior perigo de um descaminho para o mal, ou seja, para o mais completo auto-isolamento. A capacidade reflexiva e de auto-relacionamento revela-se dessa forma, uma forqa ambivalente: por um lado, constitui potencial para um auto--fechamento do ser humano na sua propria singularidade; por outro, representa um potencial de ser abertura de si-mesma em ordem a uma integracdo da sua propria singularidade Universal mais elevado. /// German Idealism's discussion of the problem of evil takes Kant's idea of "radical evil" as its departure point. Kant had used this term to designate a falsification of human freedom. Though freedom is inherent in the human being, the human being bears a responsibility for it at the same time; otherwise a moral appeal to change one's ways would have no point. Fichte sought to determine more precisely the source of this "radical evil" in the human being and found it in the human being's inherent lethargy or inertia. In this resistance of the human being's sensual nature to intellectual/spiritual activity lies the constant temptation not to take up the call to action which the categorical imperative demands. Schelling takes up the problem of evil in connection with a theory on God and Creation. The human being is still becoming that which he is meant to be, and thus the self-referentiality, or self-enclosedness, which in God's divine love are already eternally overcome, constitutes in the human being the very power of his particular will". Out of fear of losing his very self the human being is unable to go beyond himself and surrender that particular will" to the "Universal Will" as he should. In this conflict consists the drama of the Creation, a conflict which God allows himself to enter, for not to do so would mean the capitulation of good to evil. For Hegel, the problem of evil is a problem of the independence of the spirit. This independence constitutes indeed the true determination of the human being, but exactly at the very moment of the human being's finding-of-self and coming-into-himself (Sich-Finden undZusichkommen) the human being can completely miss the mark. Thus for Hegel it is precisely the conscience "-that site of greatest human autonomy and independence -which is in danger of veering off into evil, i. e., into utter self-isolation. The capacity for reflection and for self-relationship thus reveals itself as an ambivalent force: in its potential for fatal self-closing-off in its own singularity on the one hand, and in it potential for self-opening and integration of its own singularity into the higher Universal on the other. (shrink)

Haciendo uso de paquete informático Bibliometrix y de la Guía Prisma, se desarrolló un análisis bibliométrico de la literatura proveniente de la Web of Science sobre la competencia digital docente universitaria. Se delimita la investigación a través de tesauros de Eric. Se plantearon preguntas de investigación relacionadas con las fuentes de datos, los autores y las redes de colaboración. La investigación evidencia incrementos en la producción a partir del año 2019, la nacionalidad de los autores y la filiación de instituciones (...) resaltan a través de redes de investigaciones extendidas en Iberoamérica. Es necesario ampliar este estudio a otras bases científicas. (shrink)

No presente trabalho propõe-se continuar o diálogo sugerido por Alejandro Cerletti (2008), frisando o eixo kantiano e salientando suas implicações políticas. O Sapere aude (KANT, 1999) aparece como proposta para a irrupção do pensamento do outro, o que não se limita ao mero conhecimento, pois a Aufklärung é também um projeto filosófico-político (Kant, 1989). Esse é o primeiro ponto de discussão, pois entendo que esse singular projeto é o modo proposto por Kant tanto para o exercício do pensar como para (...) a realização da liberdade individual e coletiva no âmbito da ação política. Dessa maneira, quando Kant define como o filósofo deveria exercer sua função específica e o para que desse exercício, estabelece uma imbricação (não superposição nem substituição) do filosofar com a ação política, considerando o filósofo como mais um dos agentes da política, com uma função específica e importante no cenário político, a partir do próprio exercício da filosofia. Aqui, então, se desdobra o segundo ponto de discussão, pois partindo desses pressupostos, quando Kant visa a formação de cidadãos do mundo, na construção e preservação de um estado civil, o exercício da filosofia não deveria se entender como uma propedêutica, e sim como uma das instâncias da formação e do exercício da política. Por isso, a formação política faz parte do currículo de filosofia não como instrumental que posteriormente seria utilizado, em âmbitos alheios à filosofia. (shrink)

Reivindicación de Maquiavelo en la obra de Hannah Arendt -- Acercamientos a Max Weber desde una crítica a la modernidad -- La violencia como disolución de lo político.

No presente artigo, pretende-se expor e analisar as críticas que Noam Chomsky dirige contra o materialismo em filosofia da mente. Para o referido autor, a rigor, não faria sentido questionar o estatuto ontológico da mente, na medida em que os próprios físicos e filósofos materialistas desconhecem 90% da matéria que constitui o universo. Deste modo, Chomsky dirá que no tempo de Descartes, da filosofia mecânica, o que se fazia era ciência normal, ao passo que após o advento das ideias de (...) Newton, o universo passa a ser antimaterialista. O presente trabalho pode ser útil/valioso à filosofia e história das ciências naturais, à física e à filosofia da mente.The aim of this paper is to expose and analyze Noam Chomsky’s criticisms against materialism in philosophy of mind. For this author, strictly speaking, questioning the ontological status of the mind would not make sense, considering that the materialistic physicists and philosophers themselves are unaware of 90% of the matter that constitutes the universe. Accordingly, Chomsky will say that in Descartes’ time, or in times of mechanical philosophy, what was done was normal science, while after the advent of Newton's ideas the universe becomes anti-materialist. This paper can be useful/valuable to philosophy and history of natural sciences, physics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Viruses have generally been thought of as infectious agents. New data on mimivirus, however, suggests a reinterpretation of this thought. Earth’s biosphere seems to contain many more viruses than previously thought and they are relevant in the maintenance of ecosystems and biodiversity. Viruses are not considered to be alive because they are not free-living entities and do not have cellular units. Current hypotheses indicate that some viruses may have been the result of genomic reduction of cellular life forms. However, new (...) studies relating to the origins of biological systems suggest that viruses could also have originated during the transition from First to the Last Universal Common Ancestor. Within this setting, life has been established as chemical informational system and could be interpreted as a macrocode of multiple layers. The first entity to acquire these features was the First Universal Common Ancestor that evolved to an intermediate ancestral that could be named T-LUCA and be equated to Woese’s concept of progenotes. T-LUCA may have remained as undifferentiated subsystems with viruses-like structures. The net result is that both cellular life forms and viruses shared protein synthesis apparatuses. In short, virus is a strategy of life reached by two paths: T-LUCAs like entities and the reduction of cellular life forms. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an analysis of the emergence of “problematic of alien sexuality.” I first locate discourses about “alien sexuality,” and the so-called anchor baby in particular, within other national discourses surrounding maternity, the fetus, and citizenship. I analyze the ways that national political discourses surrounding “anchor babies” and “alien maternity” construct the “problematic of alien sexuality,” thus constituting the “alien” subject as always-already perverse. I suggest that this production of a sexually deviant and threatening “alien” subject functions (...) in the normative dichotomy that places the sexually pure citizen on the one hand, and the perverse anticitizen on the other, in what I call “backwards uncitizening.” My analysis of this process shows that the perverse “alien” subject, as constituted in significant part by nonjuridical normalizing mechanisms of biopower, resists the juridical discourse that is supposed to determine it. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...) with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell’s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge – a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory. (shrink)

In his 1903 Syllabus, Charles S. Peirce makes a distinction between icons and iconic signs, or hypoicons, and briefly introduces a division of the latter into images, diagrams, and metaphors. Peirce scholars have tried to make better sense of those concepts by understanding iconic signs in the context of the ten classes of signs described in the same Syllabus. We will argue, however, that the three kinds of hypoicons can better be understood in the context of Peirce's sixty-six classes of (...) signs. We analyze examples of hypoicons taken from the field of information design, describing them in the framework of the sixty-six classes, and discuss the consequences of those descriptions to the debate about the order of determination of the 10 trichotomies that form those classes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of (...) knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism. (shrink)

Dissertação: FARIA, Thiago Hot Pereira de. Mishná e Belo Horizonte: A influência da cultura oral na comunidade judaica belo-horizontina. 2014. Dissertação – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that (...) the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC). (shrink)

Este ensayo propone una lectura de la VIII de las Tesis sobre la historia, de Benjamin que la “emplea”, en el sentido en que el propio Benjamin sostenía que una exposición materialista de la historia debía emplear los fragmentos del pasado para interrogar radicalmente el presente y resistir a las opresiones. Se pone en relación esta tesis con las palabras de las mujeres zapatistas, pronunciadas con motivo de la inauguración del Segundo encuentro internacional de mujeres que luchan, para argumentar que (...) el “estado de excepción” que Benjamin había advertido era en verdad la regla, lo sigue siendo hoy específicamente (aunque no únicamente) para las mujeres y otros cuerpos, individuales y colectivos, feminizados. Se argumenta también que la tradición de lucha de las mujeres indígenas producida por una colonialidad capitalista que sigue en curso es la que hoy nos muestra la normalidad del “estado de excepción” contemporáneo. Finalmente se propone que las luchas de las mujeres son, también, ejercicios críticos y prácticas de resistencia e invención, para una justicia por-venir. (shrink)

A partir da leitura de contos do livro Ninguém é inocente em São Paulo, de Ferréz, o artigo investiga como a literatura marginal/periférica brasileira representa a experiência urbana por meio de personagens oriundos da periferia. Após essa investigação, o trabalho se desdobra sobre como conceitos de deslocamento e apropriação permitem articular a relação entre periferia e centro urbanos, com ênfase no processo de urbanização da cidade de São Paulo.

The construal of ‘exists’ as a first-order or real predicate is defended against prevailing orthodoxy.

The aim of this paper, which isframed within philosophy of religion, is todeal with the logical problem of evil andmore specifically with the theory of freewill defense of Alvin Plantinga. I wantsurvey whether this is a plausible theoryand whether it resists to some objections. Iintend to hold that this theory seems resistto some objections.

The documents published about sociology in the files between 1990 and 1999 are analyzed. The following topics are observed: distribution for years, countries, languages, types of documents, topics treated and journals in which the studies are published. At the same time the different institution..

Stroke is one of the most common causes of acquired disability, leaving numerous adults with cognitive and motor impairments, and affecting patients’ capability to live independently. Virtual Reality (VR) based methods for stroke rehabilitation have mainly focused on motor rehabilitation but there is increasing interest toward the integration of cognitive training for providing more effective solutions. Here we investigate the feasibility for stroke recovery of a virtual cognitive-motor task, the Reh@Task, which combines adapted arm reaching, and attention and memory training. (...) 24 participants in the chronic stage of stroke, with cognitive and motor deficits, were allocated to one of two groups (VR, Control). Both groups were enrolled in conventional occupational therapy, which mostly involves motor training. Additionally, the VR group underwent training with the Reh@Task and the control group performed time-matched conventional occupational therapy. Motor and cognitive competences were assessed at baseline, end of treatment (1 month) and at a 1-month follow-up through the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, Single Letter Cancelation, Digit Cancelation, Bells Test, Fugl-Meyer Assessment Test, Chedoke Arm and Hand Activity Inventory, Modified Ashworth Scale, and Barthel Index. Our results show that both groups improved in motor function over time, but the Reh@Task group displayed significantly higher between-group outcomes in the arm subpart of the Fugl-Meyer Assessment Test. Improvements in cognitive function were significant and similar in both groups. Overall, these results are supportive of the viability of VR tools that combine motor and cognitive training, such as the Reh@Task. Trial Registration: This trial was not registered because it is a small clinical study that addresses the feasibility of a prototype device. (shrink)

Animals, like humans, suffer and die from natural causes. This is particularly true of animals living in the wild, given their high exposure to, and low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. Most wild animals likely have short lives, full of suffering, usually ending in terrible deaths. This book argues that on the assumption that we have reasons to assist others in need, we should intervene in nature to prevent or reduce the harms wild animals suffer, provided that it (...) is feasible and that the expected result is positive overall. It is of the utmost importance that academics from different disciplines as well as animal advocates begin to confront this issue. The more people are concerned with wild animal suffering, the more probable it is that safe and effective solutions to the plight of wild animals will be implemented in the future. (shrink)

Se realizó una revisión sistemática de la literatura localizada en Scopus sobre la competencia digital (CD) del profesorado universitario; con ayuda de la metodología PRISMA y operadores se delimitó la investigación a través de tesauros de Eric. Los autores/entidades españolas resaltan en la temática, existen esfuerzos orientados al diseño, validación y aplicación de rúbricas a nivel mundial. Los abordajes predominantemente son cuantitativos. La investigación fortalece el entendimiento sobre la CD, existe un efecto positivo otorgado por las CD docentes en la (...) formación de estudiantes, se requiere desarrollar planes de formación y emprender esfuerzos similares en otras bases de datos científicas. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...) belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

Team reasoning is the idea that we can think as a ‘we’ and this can solve some coordination dilemmas, such as Hi-Lo. However, team reasoning can only solve the dilemmas it is intended to solve if the conditions for team reasoning warrant the belief that others will also perform team reasoning and these conditions cannot render team reasoning otiose. In this paper, I will supplement the theory of team reasoning by explaining how agency transformation also involves a change in the (...) normative attitude. To do this, I will use the theory of affordances, which is the idea that the environment provides ways to interact with it. I will argue that when a person perceives as a group member, she associates herself and the other members with the group’s mosaic of affordances. This triggers a feeling of joint ownership of the agency. It is the feeling that it is up to us to deal with the situation, so we feel entitled to demand each other to cooperate. It warrants the belief that others are team-reasoners without rendering team reasoning otiose. This means that the agency transformation (from I to we) involves a change in the normative attitude. (shrink)